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We explore the eects of Brexit on trade patterns and on the spatial distribution of industry between
the United Kingdom and the European Union and within the EU. Our study adopts a new economic
geography (NEG) perspective developing a linear model with three regions, the UK and two separated
regions composing the EU. The 3-region framework and linear demands allow for dierent trade patterns.
Two possible ante-Brexit situations are possible, depending on the interplay between local market size, local
competition and trade costs: industrial agglomeration or dispersion. Considering a soft and a hard Brexit
scenario, the ante-Brexit situation is altered substantially, depending on which scenario prevails. UK ®rms
could move to the larger EU market, even in the peripheral region, reacting to the higher trade barriers,
relocation representing a substitute for trade. Alternatively, some EU ®rms could move in the more isolated
UK market ®nding shelter from the competition inside the EU. We also consider the post-Brexit scenario of
deeper EU integration, leading to a weakening of trade links between the EU and the UK. Our analysis also
reveals a highly complex bifurcation sequence leading to many instances of multistability, intricate basins of
attraction and cyclical and chaotic dynamics.
 	
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The United Kingdom is one of the oldest members of the European Union. It joined already in 1973 during
the ®rst round of EU enlargement, after it applied to join for a ®rst time as early as 1961. This was well before
the 5th enlargement round in 2004, which was the biggest and in which ten countries joined in (Bulgaria and
Romania joined in 2007 and Croatia, the most recent entrant, in 2013). The United Kingdom comprises several
highly active regions in manufacturing and in services; it is highly integrated in the international network of
trade and factor mobility (that concerns capital as well as labour). The region of Greater London can rightly
be considered as one of the economic cores of Europe. However, on June 23, 2016 the UK voted for leaving the
European Union. In the ongoing negotiations on the conditions of this exit, various Brexit scenarios emerge,
ranging from a hard Brexit (involving a fall back to World Trade Organization rules) to a soft Brexit, in
which many features of the Single Market membership would continue (like Norway, which is member of the
European Economic Area, but not of the EU). Irrespective of the negotiations outcome, Brexit will de®nitely
have considerable repercussions in the economic activity across Europe. Empirical studies predict substantial
repercussions in trade patterns (see e.g. [10], [5] and [16], who give also a brief survey of other empirical studies
on Brexit; for a survey see also [6]): With a hard Brexit, UK exports to the European Union may fall by up
to 40%. UK imports from the European Union are also expected to decline, though by a lesser extent. With
a dierentiated methodological approach [16] expect the decline in imports to be only half of the reduction in
exports. Note that [10] take into consideration a continuing deeper integration within the EU even after Brexit.
Several studies ([10]; see also the surveys by [6], [19] and [18]) point out that welfare eects of Brexit do
not only derive from a change in trade patterns, but in particular also from a change in the pattern of factor
migration, stressing the eects on FDI ¯ows.
As [11] note, the UK is one of Europes most popular destination for FDI ¯ows. It derives its attractiveness
as industry location not only from supply side factors (such as local comparative advantages) or from the extent
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of the local UK market, but in particular from the fact that the UK provided access to the Europes Single
Market. With Brexit, the authors expect a marked decline in FDI ¯ows to the UK and, more generally, a
marked decline in the attractiveness of the UK as industry location.
To a large extent, eects on trade and on industry location are discussed separately in those empirical
studies. However, the perspective of the New Economic Geography (NEG) highlights that they are intimately
intertwined. It combines a trade model à la Krugman ([12]) based upon monopolistic competition, trade costs
and productive factors that choose location according to expected factor rewards. In these models, access to a
larger home market and the possibility to reach the other markets with low trade costs translates into higher
factor rewards, which attracts ®rms to shift their production to this particular location and to serve the local as
well as to export to the international market. This market access eect fosters agglomeration of industry in few
regions. It is mitigated by a competition eect: more ®rms in a location reduce factor rewards. In these models,
Brexit is represented by an increase in trade costs. This will change the access to international markets and
thus trade patterns; but at the same time, the attractiveness of a region for industry location changes. NEG
models focus on studying the long-run eects of a change in trade costs simultaneously on industry location
and trade patterns.
Since Krugmans seminal contribution ([13]), a plethora of NEG models emerged diering in particular
regarding the productive factor that is considered as internationally mobile and the speci®cation of the demand
function. At the core of our study is the mobility of high-quali®ed labour and capital; accordingly, we choose
a footloose entrepreneur (FE) model. We use a FE model with a linear (instead of an iso-elastic) demand
function, in which zero trade situations are possible allowing therefore to shed a very clear light on changes
in trade patterns (linear demand versions of the standard 2-region NEG model have been proposed, among
others, by [17], [2], [3] and [15]). Finally, we view the EU not as a homogenous integrated area, but rather as
split between central and peripheral regions (indeed, with the UK leaving, part of the centre leaves the Union).
Therefore, we setup a 3-region model. Our contribution extends previous works on 3-region NEG linear models
(see, for example, [1], [4], [8] and [9]) in three directions: i) we assume a dierent and more general geography
of trade barriers allowing for a much larger set of possible trade network structures; ii) we study the impact on
dynamics of two dierent types of trade costs; iii) we apply our study to evaluate the consequences of a timely
historical event.
Indeed, in this model, we study various eects of Brexit. Given the notorious analytic complexity of mul-
tiregional NEG models (for a comprehensive review on multi-regional NEG modelling, see [7]), we primarily
present simulation results complemented by intuitive explanations of the underlying economic forces. We show
that two ante Brexit situations are possible, as a NEG perspective suggests. They depend upon the speci®c
interplay between local market size, local competition and trade costs: First, the economy is well-integrated
with small local market sizes and low trade costs; NEG models typically predict agglomeration of economic
activity. Second, local market sizes are bigger and NEG models suggest an equal distribution of economic
activity. Accordingly, we choose two dierent values for the local market size.
For both options, we study a soft vs a hard Brexit scenario involving dierent increases in trade cost between
the UK and the regions remaining in the Union. In addition, we study the eects of a deeper integration within
the Union as a reaction to Brexit.
We show that Brexit triggers a highly complex bifurcation sequence involving many instances of coexisting
attractors (with complicate basins of attraction) and of cyclical and complex dynamics. Among our results, we
®nd the following of particular interest:
 Brexit may induce ®rms to leave the UK and move to the regions within the Union; the ®rms in the Union
(continue to) export, while the ®rms remaining in the UK do not (any more)  thus, ®rm relocation acts
as substitute for trade;
 most remarkably, Brexit may induce ®rm relocation also to a peripheral region within the Union (that
did not host industry before Brexit);
 envisaging a post- hard Brexit scenario, the progressing of EU integration may lead to a weakening of the
trade links between the EU and the UK and put peripheral regions in danger to lose again their industry;
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 in some instances, intense competition within the Union may lead to the opposite result with ®rm moving
to the UK to reduce the competitive pressure.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 states its main assumptions, whereas Section 3 analyses the
short run equilibrium, paying particular attention to the dierent possible trade structures. Section 4 studies
the long run implications of the model and analyses the various Brexit scenarios. Section 5 concludes.
 
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The economy is composed of three regions, labelled Rr with r = 1, 2, 3; two sectors: agriculture A and manufac-
turingM ; two types of agents: workers (L, endowed with unskilled labour) and entrepreneurs (E, endowed with
human capital). Workers are mobile across sectors but immobile across regions; entrepreneurs migrate across
regions but are speci®c to manufacturing. Finally, the A-sector does not necessarily represents only Agriculture
but it could also include the tertiary sector which is typically less mobile than industry.
The three regions have the same endowment of labour, L = L = L = L , share the same technology and
consumers preferences.
The A-sector is perfectly competitive, constant returns prevail and production involves one unit of labour to
produce one unit of the output. In the monopolistically competitiveM -sector, the N varieties of a dierentiated
commodity are produced by using one entrepreneur as a ®xed component and h units of labour for each additional
unit of output. The total cost of production (TC) is expressed as TC = pi + whqi, where pi represents the
operating pro®t and the remuneration of one entrepreneur, w the wage rate, h the labour input requirement
and qi the quantity produced of variety i. There are no economies of scope, thus due to increasing returns each
®rm produces only a variety. Following from the assumption that one entrepreneur is required to activate the
production of a variety, the total number of varieties is equal to to the total number of entrepreneurs, E = N .
Denoting by lr the share of entrepreneurs located in region Rr, the number of varieties produced in this region
corresponds to Nr = lrN = lrE.
The representative consumers (unskilled worker or entrepreneur) preferences are quasi-linear (see [17]),
composed of a quadratic sub-utility de®ning the choice across the N varieties of the M -good and a linear part
for the consumption of the A-good:
U = a
N
i
ci -

b - d
2
 N
i
ci -
d
2

N
i
ci

+ CA, (1)
where ci is the consumption of variety i and CA the consumption of the A-good. The parameters are interpreted
as follows: a > 0 is the intensity of preferences over the M -varieties, d > 0 the degree of substitutability across
those varieties and the dierence b - d measures the taste for variety; where b > d > 0.
The budget constraint is
N
i
ici + ACA, (2)
where i is the price of variety i, A the price of the agricultural good, y the consumers income and CA her
endowment of the agricultural good, suYciently large to allow for positive consumption in equilibrium.
The cost of trading varieties of the M -good between regions, lets say from Rr to Rs (or in the opposite
direction from Rs to Rr) is Trs(= Tsr); with Trs > 0 for r = s, Trr = 0 and r, s = 1, 2, 3. Trade costs separate
the regions introducing the spatial dimension into the economy. Dierent con®gurations are possible, for our
purposes we assume that the trade distance between R and R and R and R is the same, whereas the distance
between R and R could be shorter: T = T = TE ³ T = TU . These assumptions on trade costs describe
a 3-region economy where R and R are part of a more integrated area, whereas R could be less integrated
with the rest of the economy. Thus, we provide a stylized set-up that can be used to describe dierent scenarios
following the UKs choice to leave the EU. We ®rst consider the eects of an increase in TE starting from the
initial state TE = TU . We de®ne it as the ®rst phase of Brexit (the exit of the UK from the EU). We then
consider the eects of a reduction of TU when TE > TU , in order to study the consequences of a second phase
following Brexit (EU deeper integration).
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In a short-run equilibrium the distribution of entrepreneurs across the regions is given. All markets are in
equilbrium. We choose the A-good as the numeraire. From perfect competition in the A-sector, it follows
A = w = 1.
To determine the short-run equilibrium solutions related to theM -sector, we proceed as follows. Maximizing
the utility (1) subject to the constraint (2), we obtain the ®rst order conditions for i = 1, ..., N :
¶U
¶ci
= a- (b - d)ci - d
N
i
ci - i = 0,
from which
i = a- (b - d)ci - d
N
i
ci.
Solving for ci, we obtain the individual linear demand function for each variety i:
ci = max[0, - (+ cN)i + cP ],
where P =
N
i
i is the price index and
 =
a
(N - 1)d + b ,  =
1
(N - 1)d + b and c =
d
(b - g)[(N - 1)d + b] .
Moreover, we de®ne i = acPbcN the cut-o price only below which the demand for variety i is positive: that is,
ci > 0 for i < i.
The representative consumers indirect utility corresponds to
V = S + y + CA,
where S is the consumers surplus:
S = U -
N
i
ici - CA = 
N
2
+
+ cN
2
N
i
i - P -
c
2
P .
The consumers demand originating from Rs (s = 1, 2, 3) for a good produced in Rr (r = 1, 2, 3), dropping
the subscript i because of symmetric ®rm behavior (a typical assumption of NEG models), is:
crs = max[0, - (+ cN)rs + cPs],
where rs is the price of a good produced in Rr and consumed in Rs and
Ps =

k
nkks =

k
lkEks (3)
is the price index in Rs. As before crs > 0 if and only if rs < s = acPbcN .
Taking into account that workers are equally spread across the regions, L = L = L = L , with segmented
markets, the operating pro®t of a representative ®rm located in Rr (r = 1, 2, 3) is:
pr =

s
(rs - h - Trs)qrs

L
3
+ lsE

. (4)
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In a short-run equilibrium, demand is equal to supply in each segmented market (labelled r, s = 1, 2, 3):
crs = qrs. From pro®t maximization, recalling that N = E and that ®rms consider the price index as given, the
®rst order conditions follow
rr =
+ cPr + h(+ cE)
2(+ cE)
=
1
2
(r + h), (5)
which is the price that ®rms quote in the market where they are located, where r = acPbcE ; and
rs =

acPhTbcE
bcE =

 (s + h + Trs) if Trs < s - hs if Trs ³ s - h , (6)
which is the price that a ®rm located in Rr quotes in the market s, with r, s = 1, 2, 3 and r = s.
Using the demand function and the price solutions, we can write:
qrr = (+ cE)(rr - h), (7)
which is the quantity sold in the local market; and
qrs =

(+ cE)(rs - h - Trs) if Trs < s - hs if Trs ³ s - h , (8)
which is the quantity that a ®rm located in Rr sells in Rs, with r, s = 1, 2, 3 and r = s.
According to (6) and (8), if a ®rm located in Rr quotes in the market of Rs a price larger or equal than the
cut-o price s (i.e. a price which is above the maximum reservation price consumers living in Rs are prepared
to pay for a positive quantity of a variety), the export from Rr to Rs is zero. The boundary conditions for
trade, as reported in these expressions, are crucial to determine the patterns of trade between the regions, as
we shall see in the analysis below.
The indirect utility for a r-entrepreneur is
Vr = Sr + pr + CA, (9)
where
Sr =
E
2
+
+ cE
2

s
lsE

sr - Pr -
c
2
P r (10)
is the surplus enjoyed by a r-entrepreneur as a consumer.
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From the discussion above, the occurrence of trade between regions depends on trade costs. Above a threshold
the price quoted by foreign ®rms is too high and exports cannot take place. It follows that the trade network
structure between the regions is strongly aected by their trade distance; and it also aected by the spatial
distribution of industry. In this subsection, we make explicit the conditions for trade between the three regions
and verify that not all network structures are possible given the chosen trade costs con®guration.
Considering the three regions, R, R and R, the existence of a trade link from one of them, labelled Rr, to
a second one, labeled Rs, depends on trade costs and on competition in the local market originating both from
local and foreign ®rms. The latter is aected by the existence or absence of another link from the third region,
labelled Rk, to Rs, with r, s, k = 1, 2, 3 and r = s = k. If such a link is absent, r-®rms (i.e. those located in Rr)
only face competition from the local s-®rms; instead, if it is present, r-®rms face competition also from k-®rms
(i.e. those located in Rk) exporting to Rs.
In general, (see above expressions (6) and (8)), the condition for trade (resp. no trade) from Rr to Rs is:
Trs < (³)s - h = 2(ss - h).
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When trade costs are too high for a link from Rr to Rs, Trs ³ 2(ss - h), and for a link from Rk to Rs as well,
Tsk ³ 2(ss - h), the price quoted by s-®rms in the local market is:
ss =
+ h(+ clsE)
2+ clsE
.
If this equation holds, the condition for no trade from Rr to Rs becomes:
Trs ³ 2(- h)
2+ clsE
. (11)
It is useful to rewrite the above condition as
ls ³ 2(- h- Trs)
cETrs
. (12)
When trade costs are suYciently low so that Trs < 2(ss - h) and a link from Rr to Rs is allowed, but a
link from Rk to Rs is still missing, Tks ³ 2(ss - h), the local price is:
ss =
+ h[+ c(lr + ls)E] +
T
 clrE
2+ c(lr + ls)E
.
If this equation holds, the condition for trade from Rr to Rs is:
Trs <
2(- h)
2+ clsE
. (13)
For our purposes we rewrite the above expression as
ls <
2(- h- Trs)
cETrs
. (14)
Note that since TE ³ TU , condition (13) can only be applied to r, s = 1, 2 and k = 3.1 Finally, looking at
conditions (11), (12), (13) and (14), it is easy to verify that the condition for trade (no trade) is less (more)
stringent the smaller are ls and Trs. That is, trade from Rr and Rs is more likely the less competive is the
market in Rs (where the degree of competition is given by the number of local s-®rms) and the closer are Rr
and Rs; vice versa, a more competitive market in Rs and a long trade distance between Rr and Rs may impede
r-®rms exporting towards Rs.
When a trade link from Rk to region Rs exists, Tsk < 2(ss - h), and trade costs between Rr and Rs are
high, Trs ³ 2(ss - h), the price ®xed locally by s-®rms is:
ss =
+ h[+ c(ls + lk)E] +
T
 clkE
2+ c(ls + lk)E
.
If this equation holds, the condition for the absence of one-way trade from Rr to Rs is:
Trs ³ 2(- h) + cElkTsk
2+ c(ls + lk)E
. (15)
Note that since TE ³ TU , this inequality can only be applied for r = 3 and s, k = 1, 2.2 It can be alternatively
expressed as:
ls ³ 2(- h- Trs)
cETrs
+
Tsk - Trs
Trs
lk. (16)
1Because of the inequality    some of the trade structures are not allowed. Speci®cally, if a link from  to  is not
possible (or from  to ) then a link from  to  (or from  to ) is not allowed as well (alternatively, if a link from 
to  (or from  to ) occurs, then a link from  to  (or from  to ) must occur as well). Moreover, due to symmetry,
if a link from  to  is not possible, then a link from  to  is not possible as well (alternatively, the link from  to  and
the link from  to  occur simultaneously).
2 See the discussion in the previous footnote.
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Finally, when Tsk < 2(ss - h) and Trs < 2(ss - h), we have that
ss =
+ h(+ cE) +
	
T
 lr +
T
 lk


cE
2+ cE
.
If this equation holds, the condition for the presence of one-way trade between Rr and Rs is:
Trs <
2(- h) + cElkTsk
2+ c(ls + lk)E
, (17)
that can be alternatively expressed as:
ls <
2(- h- Trs)
cETrs
+
Tsk - Trs
Trs
lk. (18)
Finally, looking at conditions (15), (16), (17) and (18), the condition for trade (no trade) from Rr and Rs
is less (more) stringent the smaller are ls, lk (therefore, the larger is lr) and Trs and the larger is Tsk. That
is, trade from Rr and Rs is more (less) likely the less competitive is the market is Rs (where now the degree of
competition is also determined by the number of k-®rms selling in market s), the closer are Regions Rr and Rs
and the farther away are regions Rs and Rk.
Combining these conditions (as shown in the Appendix), the possible trade network structures (NS) are
eighteen (see Fig.1), grouped into ten types (which are isomorphic) and characterised as follows:3
NS1: the three-region economy is fully autarkic, no trade link is present (this is called empty graph in the
language of social network analysis (SNA)). Only one network structure of this type exists;
NS2: one-way (or unilateral) trade from Rr to Rs, where r, s = 1, 2 and r = s (single edge in the language
of SNA). Two structure of this type exists (NS21, NS22);
NS3: two-way (or bilateral) trade between Rr and Rs, where r, s = 1, 2 and r = s (mutual edge). Only one
structure of this type exists;
NS4: one-way trade from Rr to Rs and from Rk to Rs, where r, s, k = 1, 2, 3 and r = s = k (in star). Three
structures of this type exists (NS41, NS42, NS43);
NS5: two-way trade between Rr and Rs and one-way trade from Rk to Rr, where r, s = 1, 2, k = 3 and
r = s (mutual edge + in). Two structures of this type exist (NS51, NS52);
NS6: one-way trade from Rr to Rs, Rr to Rk and Rs to Rk, where r, s = 1, 2, k = 3 and r = s (transitive).
Two structures of this type exist (NS61, NS62).
NS7: one-way trade from Rr to Rs and from Rr to Rk and bilateral trade between Rs and Rk, where
r, s, k = 1, 2, 3 and r = s = k (mutual edge + double in). Three structures of this type exist (NS71, NS72,
NS73);
NS8: two-way trade between Rr and Rs, one way trade from Rr to Rk and from Rs to Rk, where r, s = 1, 2,
k = 3 and r = s (mutual edge + double out). Only one structure of this type exists;
NS9: two-way trade between Rr and Rs and Rs and Rk and one-way trade from Rr to Rk, where r, s = 1, 2,
k = 3 and r = s (almost complete graph). Two structure of this type exist (NS91, NS92);
NS10: All regions are engaged in mutual trade (complete graph). Only one structure of this type exists.
Note that in the special case TU = TE , only eight structures are possible grouped into four isomorphic cases
(NS1, NS41, NS42, NS43, NS71, NS72, NS73, NS10).
 
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To each trade network con®guration  which depends on trade costs and on the spatial distribution of entre-
preneurs  corresponds a dierent set of short-run solutions. We cannot present here the whole set of solutions
(but see the Appendix). Figs 2a-d present examples of possible con®gurations of trade costs giving rise to
dierent trade network con®gurations. All ®gures are plotted for  =  = c =  , h = 0, E = 10 and for a)
TU = TE = 0.325, b) TU = 0.325 and TE = 0.37, c) TU = 0.325 and TE = 0.45 and d) TU = 0.25 and TE = 0.45.
3These network structures are known in the language of social network analysis as triads.
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Figure 1: Trade network structures.
In these ®gures, the combinations of l and l (after taking into account that l = 1 - l - l) that allow
for a speci®c network con®guration are represented by areas with dierent colors. A dotted line, as the lines
A, A and C, corresponds to the conditions (12) and (14), that is, there is not an incoming trade link from
a third region aecting the existence of a link between two regions; and a solid line, as the lines B and B,
to the conditions (16) and (18), that is, such an incoming link exists (however, notice that when TU = TE the
two sets of conditions are identical). A line is red when only R and R are involved, as the lines A and A,
and it is blue when also R is involved, as the lines B, B and C. Moreover, trade is allowed (not allowed) on
the left (right) of A and B, below (above) A and B and above (below) C (see also next Section). Finally,
consider that borders and vertices of the triangles in Fig. 2 represent special cases. On a single border ®rms are
located in only two regions, whereas the third region is empty and on a vertex (the crossing of two borders) all
industry is agglomerated in one region. Therefore, some of the outward links (involving exporting ®rms), that
may occur in a neighborhood of a point on a border or of a vertex (where all the industry shares are positive),
are necessarily absent in those points without industry.
Dierences in indirect utilities drives the dynamic process as discussed in the following Section. Before
that it could be of some interest to see what happens when a boundary line is crossed starting from a given
distribution of ®rms. We consider a speci®c example: suppose that the initial distribution of ®rms corresponds
to a point in NS51 in Fig. 2b, corresponding to the horizontal stripe part of NS5, somewhere in the middle
of that area. In NS51, R and R are undertaking bilateral trade and R is exporting towards R. The given
distribution of ®rms leads most probably to the long-run equilibrium BA where ®rms are located only in R
and R (see Fig.4b, where TE is slightly higher and where points in RS51 mostly converge to that equilibrium).
Now let TE increase, so that the point enters in NS3. We have that, the link from R to R is cut. For the given
distribution of ®rms, pro®ts for R and R increase and decrease for R, moreover the surplus of R decreases
while for R and R it does not change (see the Appendix). Therefore, V increases, V decreases while V could
increase or decrease. These changes lead to a dierent long-run outcome, that is, IA, where ®rms are located
in all three regions (see Fig.4d).
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Figure 2: Examples of possible con®gurations of trade costs giving rise to dierent trade network con®gurations.
Here  =  = c =  , h = 0, E = 10 and TU = TE = 0.325 in (a), TU = 0.325, TE = 0.37 in (b), TU = 0.325,
TE = 0.45 in (c) and TU = 0.25, TE = 0.45 in (d).
 

The dynamics of the considered NEG model is described by a two-dimensional (2D) piecewise smooth map
Z :  ®  de®ned as follows:
Z :

l
l

®

Z(l, l)
Z(l, l)

, (19)
where
Zi(l, l) =
ìïïïïíïïïïî
0 if Fi £ 0,
Fi if Fi > 0, Fj > 0, Fi + Fj < 1,
F
F  F
if Fi > 0, Fj > 0, Fi + Fj ³ 1,
F
 - F if Fi > 0, Fj £ 0, Fi + Fj < 1,
1 if Fi > 0, Fj £ 0, Fi + Fj ³ 1,
with i = 1, j = 2 for Z(l, l) and i = 2, j = 1 for Z(l, l) ,
Fr(l, l) = lr(1 + gWr(l, l)), r = 1, 2 ,
Wr(l, l) =
Vr(l, l)
lV(l, l) + lV(l, l) + (1- l - l)V(l, l) - 1.
The indirect utilities Vi(l, l), i = 1, 2, 3, of an entrepreneur in regions 1, 2 and 3, respectively, are de®ned in
the Appendix.
The following properties of map Z follow immediately from its de®nition:
 	 In the (l, l)-phase plane any trajectory of map Z is trapped in a triangle denoted S, whose


 or 

Ib = {(l, l) : l = 0}, Ib = {(l, l) : l = 0}, Ib = {(l, l) : l = 1- l} (20)
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are  
 of map Z.
 . Map Z is symmetric with respect to the diagonal D = {(l, l) : l = l}, which is one more
invariant line of Z.
Property 2 implies that the phase portrait of map Z is symmetric with respect to D, i.e., any invariant set
A is either itself symmetric with respect to D or there exists one more invariant set A symmetric to A.
 	 The vertices of S are  (CP ) ®xed points
CP : (l, l) = (0, 0), CP : (l, l) = (1, 0), CP : (l, l) = (0, 1), (21)
characterised by full spatial agglomeration of the industrial activity, with all the entrepreneurs located in only
one region.
 	 Any    of Z, if it exists, is given by intersection of the curves
W = {(l, l) : W(l, l) = 0} and W = {(l, l) : W(l, l) = 0}. (22)
An interior equilibrium is characterised by positive shares of entrepreneurs in all regions.
 	 Any    belonging to Ibi, i = 1, 2, if it exists, is an intersection point of Wi and Ibi,
while any border ®xed point belonging to Ib is an intersection point of W, W and Ib. A border equilibrium
is characterised by positive shares of entrepreneurs in two regions and no entrepreneurs in the third one.
We denote an interior symmetric ®xed point as IS : (l, l) =
	

 ,



 Î D, and an interior asymmetric
®xed point as IA. The border symmetric / asymmetric ®xed points are denoted as BSi / BAi Î Ibi, i = 1, 2, 3.
In case of coexisting ®xed points of the same type we use additional labels. Note that a border symmetric
equilibrium is such that, when positive, the two shares are equal to  . For TE = TU map Z has only one
symmetric equilibrium, BS : (l, l) =
	

 ,



 Î Ib.
Besides the borders Ibi of the triangle S, map Z changes its de®nition along ®ve more borders (which
depending on the parameters may intersect or not the triangle S):
A :

(l, l) : l = l ; A : (l, l) : l = l ;
B :

(l, l) : l = l- kl

; B :

(l, l) : l = l- kl

;
C :

(l, l) : l = 1- l- l

;
(23)
where
l =
2(- h- TE)
cETE
, l = 2(- h- TU )
cETU
, k =
TE - TU
TE
.
These borders refer to the conditions for trade between the regions R, R and R, namely,
 A : If l ³ l, trade from R to R cannot occur, while if l < l it is possible;
 A : If l ³ l, trade from R to R cannot occur, while if l < l it is allowed;
 B : If l ³ l- kl, trade from R to R cannot occur, otherwise, if l < l- kl, trade is possible;
 B : If l ³ l- kl, trade from R to R cannot occur, while if l < l- kl it is allowed;
 C : If l £ 1-l-l, trade from R to R and from R to R is not possible. Instead, when l > 1-l-l,
trade from R to R and from R to R is allowed.
To investigate dependence of the dynamics of map Z on the parameters TE , TU and L in our simulations
we ®x
 =  = c =
1
3
, CA = 1, h = 0, g = 10, E = 10, (24)
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Figure 3: Bifurcation structure of the (TE , L)-parameter plane of map Z at TU = 0.325 and other parameters
®xed as in (24).
and consider ®rst the bifurcation structure of the (TE , L)-parameter plane for ®xed TU = 0.325, then of the
(TE , TU )-parameter plane for ®xed L = 20.
In Fig.3 we present 2D bifurcation diagram in the (TE , L)-parameter plane for TU = 0.325, where the regions
of qualitatively similar dynamics are marked. In particular, the region denoted CP is related to coexisting
attracting Core-periphery ®xed points CP, CP, CP; the regions BA and BS to the border ®xed points
BA, BA and BS, respectively; the region shown in red is related to an attracting interior ®xed point(s); the
regions shown in green, light blue and magenta are associated with attracting 2-, 3- and 4-cycles, respectively;
the pink region corresponds either to a Milnor attractor4 on the border Ib or to the M-attracting5 ®xed points
CP and CP. All the regions are separated by the boundaries related to various bifurcations, among which
the boundaries denoted by BT and F correspond to the border-transcritical and fold bifurcations, respectively,
of ®xed points indicated in the lower index.
Given that only one initial point is used to produce the bifurcation diagram shown in Fig.3, coexisting
attractors can be discovered considering their basins of attraction. Below we present examples of attractors and
their basins in Figs 4, 6 and 9, where attracting, repelling and saddle ®xed points are marked by black, white
and gray circles, respectively; the curves Wi, i = 1, 2, given in (22), as well as the border lines Ai, Bi and C
given in (23) are also shown.
  

    
In this subsection, we study the eects of Brexit, following an increase in TE for a given TU . As a NEG
perspective suggests, we will consider two dierent ante-Brexit scenarios depending on the interplay between
the value of the immobile component of consumers demand, represented by the parameter L, local competition
and trade costs. In the ®rst scenario, this component of consumers demand is relatively small, L = 20, that
4An attractor according to the topological de®nition is a closed invariant set with a dense orbit, which has a neighborhood
each point of which is attracted to the attractor. An attractor in Milnor sence (see [14]) does not require existence of such a
neighborhood, but only a set of points of positive measure, attracted to the attractor.
5For short we say that an invariant set is M-attractor if it is attracting in Milnor sense, but not in a sense of the topological
de®nition.
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is, twice the size of the overall number of entrepreneurs, E, representing the mobile component of demand; the
economy is well-integrated with a comparatively small immobile component of demand; for low trade costs,
NEG models typically predict agglomeration of economic activity. In the second scenario, local market sizes are
bigger, L = 30, that is, three times the size of E. For this scenario, NEG models suggest an equal distribution
of economic activity, even when trade costs are not high. In our discussion, we proceed as follow: we describe
how stability properties of the equilibria and the dynamics are aected by changing the relevant parameters,
followed by the economic interpretation of the results.
Let us investigate how the dynamics changes for increasing value of TE at ®xed L = 20. We begin from the
value TE = TU = 0.325. As one can see in Fig.4a, for such parameter values there are six coexisting attracting
®xed points: Core-periphery ®xed points CP, CP, CP and symmetric border points BS, BS and BS.
The basins of attraction of the Core-periphery ®xed points are relatively small, and for increasing TE at ®rst
CP becomes unstable via a border-transcritical bifurcation (when the boundary BTCP is crossed, see Fig.3)
leading to ®ve coexisting attracting ®xed points (see Fig.4b where TE = 0.35). If we continue to increase TE the
interior ®xed point denoted IA (see Fig.4b) collides with the border B. As a result a border collision bifurcation
(BCB for short) occurs due to which IA becomes stable and a couple of new interior saddle ®xed points are
born. Then CP and CP also lose their stability via a border-transcritical bifurcation (when the boundary
BTCP is crossed). After this bifurcation map Z has four coexisting attracting ®xed points: BA, BA, BS
and IA (see Fig.4c where TE = 0.38). For further increasing TE , the ®xed point BS loses its stability due to
a border-transcritical bifurcation (when the boundary BTBS is crossed) merging with the ®xed point IA, so
that only three attractors are left: the ®xed points BA, BA and IA (see Fig.4d where TE = 0.45).
Figure 4: Basins of coexisting attracting ®xed points of map Z for TU = 0.325, L = 20 and TE = 0.325 in (a),
TE = 0.35 in (b), TE = 0.38 in (c) and TE = 0.45 in (d). The other parameters are ®xed as in (24).
In Fig.4a we have chosen the parameter values according to the ®rst scenario mentioned above and the
interior symmetric ®xed point, IS, is unstable. Four ante-Brexit constellations, which involve full or partial
agglomeration and which are dierent from an economic point of view (though some of them are analytically
isomorphic), are possible stable long-run positions:
 Agglomeration of industrial activity in the leaving region (R, the UK), represented by CP;
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 agglomeration of industrial activity in one of the Unions regions, ie CP or CP;
 equal distribution of industrial activity between the leaving region R and one of the regions remaining
in the Union, whereas one of the Unions regions is peripheral, insofar it does not host any industrial
production, ie BS or BS;
 equal distribution of industrial activity between the two regions that remain in the Union, while R had
no industry, i.e. BS.
Note that those constellations exhibit dierent trade patterns: A CP equilibrium only involves outwards
trade, the Core is exporting to both the other two regions (points in the neighborhood of such equilibria with
positive ls are characterised by network structure NS7). Instead, in a BS equilibrium the two regions with
industry only export towards the empty region and are not trading with each other (points in the neighborhood
of such equilibria with positive ls are characterised by network structure NS4). In Fig. 5 the panels in the top
line represent the four possible ante- Brexit constellations; a square around the number of a region indicates
that it is not empty, ie that industry is located in this region; a solide line indicates a trade link.
The consequences of a soft Brexit can be seen by comparing Fig 4a with Fig.4b, where TE is slightly increased
above TU . We dierentiate according to the ante-Brexit situation:
 The CP equilibrium (in which industry was agglomerated in the UK) loses stability. With small shocks,
some of the ®rms move to one of the Unions regions in order to gain market access (while the other
Unions region continues to be peripheral, i.e. without industry) leading to BA or BA. Trade patterns
will also change and are given by NS4  R will no longer export to the region to which ®rms have
moved, but only to the peripheral region; instead, the newly industrialised region within the Union starts
to export also to the peripheral region; this situation is depicted in Fig. 5 middle line, ®rst panel (where
a dashed line indicates ®rm movement);
 agglomeration of industrial activity in one of the Unions regions, i.e. CP or CP, is still possible;
however, the basin of attraction shrunk and small shocks will again push the economy to either BA or
BA, in which case some of the ®rms move from the Union to R. Trade patterns change to NS4: The
industrialised region within the Union will continue to export to the other region within the Union, but
does no longer export to R; instead, R will start exporting to the peripheral region within the Union;
this situation is depicted in Fig. 5, middle line, second panel;
 border equilibria, in which industry is found in one of the Unions regions and in the leaving region R,
will exhibit asymmetries; ®rms move from the leaving region R to one of the Unions regions; BA and
BA involve a higher share of industry for the Union region, and a lower share for the leaving region;
in addition, their basin of attraction has increased. Trade patterns continue to be of the NS4 type; this
situtaion is depicted in Fig. 5, middle line, third panel;
 the border equilibrium BS is still possible, but with a smaller basin of attraction making this constellation
less robust to shocks. Trade patterns continue to be of the NS4 type (Fig. 5; middle line, fourth panel).
Interestingly, imposing a harder Brexit makes an interior solution, in which industry is distributed over all
three regions, more likely: IA gains stability and its basin of attraction expands. Note that this equilibrium
involves a larger share of ®rms in region R compared to IS. Note in addition, that IA is located in area
NS3, thus trade is only between the regions within the Union; and no trade occurs with R (which becomes
autarkic). Comparing Fig. 4a with Fig. 4d reveals the following consequences of a hard Brexit:
 The CP equilibrium (in which industry was agglomerated in the UK) loses stability and IA is the most
likely outcome. Firms from the UK move to the two regions within the Union in order to get market
access. Trade pattern change: The two regions within the Union start trading with each other, but not
with R; ®rms remaining in R will no longer export (because of the higher trade costs and the higher
competition within the Union). Interestingly, R changed from being the only exporting region to an
autarkic region; this situation is depicted in Fig. 5, bottom line, ®rst panel;
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 agglomeration of industrial activity in one of the Unions regions, i.e. CP or CP, is no longer a likely
outcome. Similar to a soft Brexit, small shocks will lead to BA or BA, i.e. to a situation in which some
of the ®rms leave the Union to move to R (the UK); a larger shock will push the economy to IA, in
which ®rms also move to the peripheral region within the Union (see Fig. 5, bottom line, second panel);
 border equilibria, in which industry is found in one of the Unions regions and in the leaving region R,
are still possible, but will exhibit asymmetries (larger share of industry for the region within the Union)
and have a reduced basin of attraction. Again, larger shocks will push the economy to IA. Again,
the peripheral region within the Union attracts industry from the leaving region R, because it provides
access to the Union market, and from the Unions industrialised region because the overall market is now
smaller (since R is more diYcult to be reached and has less ®rms) and it is no longer suYcient to sustain
agglomeration within the Union. At the same time, ®rms in the once peripheral region start to export to
the Unions other region since now that market is comparatively more accessible and less competitive (see
Fig. 5, bottom line, third panel);
 the border equilibrium BS, in which industry is only located within the Union, loses stability and the
economy will move to IA, some ®rms leave the Union in order to locate in R, where they ®nd less
competition than in the Union. The larger TE the stronger this motivation becomes (Fig. 5, bottom line,
fourth panel).
To sum up: Before Brexit, the Union was well integrated and  corresponding to a NEG logic  agglomeration
in one or two regions was a very likely outcome. In a soft Brexit scenario, core-periphery outcomes become
less likely and agglomeration in the Union is possible but less likely as TE increases. With a hard Brexit, the
equilibrium IA, in which industry is located in all three regions, becomes more likely. Thus, with a hard
Brexit, peripheral regions that did not have industry can attract ®rms. Note that trade will be only between
the Unions regions, whereas R becomes autarkic.
As can be seen in Fig. 3, for larger values of L the bifurcation structure becomes more complicated,
involving attracting cycles of dierent periods (this occurs because the value of g is suYciently large). As a
second scenario in Fig. 6, we assume L = 30 to be ®xed and the value of TE be increasing. As before we begin
with TE = TU = 0.325. As illustrated in Fig.6a, for such parameter values map Z has a unique attractor, which
is the interior symmetric ®xed point IS. Note that border ®xed points have already lost their stability via a ¯ip
bifurcation, so that on the borders of the triangle S there are saddle cycles of period 2. Bifurcations occurring
for increasing TE in the 1D map, which is a restriction of map Z to the diagonal, are illustrated in Fig.7 by
means of a 1D bifurcation diagram l versus TE for l = l and TU < TE < 0.4.
As one can see in Fig.7, for increasing TE the interior ®xed point IA remains stable up to a ¯ip BCB which
occurs when IA collides with the border C. After this bifurcation the unique attractor of Z is a 2-cycle belonging
to the diagonal (see Fig.6b where TE = 0.37). Then the 2-cycle collides with the border B. This collision does
not lead to a qualitative change (i.e., a persistence border collision occurs), after which a ¯ip bifurcation of the
2-cycle leads to an attracting 4-cycle (see Fig.6c where TE = 0.38). For further increasing TE the 4-cycle collides
with the border C. Such a BCB leads to a 4-cyclic or 4-piece chaotic attractor, which then undergoes a merging
bifurcation giving rise to a 2-cyclic or 2-piece chaotic attractor. This attractor in its turn also undergoes a
merging bifurcation and is transformed into one-piece chaotic attractor (see Fig.6d where a chaotic attractor
is shown for TE = 0.4). For further increasing TE the attractor on the diagonal disappears (more precisely, it
is transformed into a chaotic repellor) due a contact with the border Ib (when the parameter point enters the
pink region in Fig.3) after which almost all the initial points of S are attracted to an M-attractor belonging
to Ib. This attractor eventually disappears due to a contact with the ®xed points CP and CP, so that they
become M-attracting.
From an economic point of view, the case of L = 30 represents a dierent situation from the one discussed
regarding Fig. 4: Markets are larger, and trade costs are not suYciently low to make the Union a well-integrated
area. As NEG models would predict, before Brexit every region hosts the same number of ®rms and trades with
all other regions, i.e. the initial equilibrium is the interior symmetric equilibrium IS located in NS10.
From the analytic discussion above (see also Fig. 7), note that Brexit does not destroy the symmetry between
the two regions remaining in the Union (l = l = lD prevails); a moderate increase in TE , i.e. a soft Brexit,
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Figure 5: Industry location and network structure, top line: Ante Brexit; middle line: Soft Brexit, bottom line:
Hard Brexit; a box around a regions number indicates industry loction in that region; a solid arrow indicates
a trade link; a dashed line indicates ®rm movement
increases the incentive for ®rms to move to region R (where they are sheltered from competition) and the
regions within the Union R and R lose ®rms. In contrast, a hard Brexit involving a sharper increase in TE
may have a destabilizing eect leading to cyclical and chaotic patterns. Most remarkable, also these complex
dynamic patterns retain the symmetry between the regions within the Union R and R. Finally, note that we
do not observe  full or partial  agglomeration of industry; industry stays active in all regions.
In Figure 7, the lines A, B and C allow an easy determination of the trade patterns and how they change
with increasing TE .
Initially, in the ante-Brexit situation and for a moderated increase in TE , lD lies between the B and C lines;
this corresponds to NS10 and we observe a full trade network. Interestingly, the period-2 cycle (lD and lD,
with lD > lD), that is born as lD crosses the C line, involves several distinct trade patterns:
 Initially, lD continues to lie in NS10, which corresponds to the full trade network. However, lD lies
below the C line in an area which corresponds to NS7: The Unions regions R and R trade with each
other and R exports to them; however, the Unions regions do not export to R, since a low lD translates
into a high number of ®rms in R and to an intense competition;
 the trade patterns over the cycle changes, when lD further increases, crosses the B line and enters the
area corresponding to NS8: The Unions regions R and R are still trading with each other. Given the
high value of lD and the corresponding high (low) number of ®rms in the Union (R), competition is
high in the Unions regions, but low in R: so exporting to R is attractive for ®rms located in the Unions
regions, but exporting to the Union is not attractive for ®rms in R. lD continues to involve NS7;
 the next change in the trade pattern occurs when lD crosses the B line and enters the area corresponding
to NS3, implying that region R is autarkic and does not trade at all  given TE , lD is in an intermediate
range where there is no incentive for trade between R and the Unions regions. The latter continue to
trade with each other and lD remains in the area associated with NS8.
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Figure 6: Attractors of map Z for TU = 0.325, L = 30 and TE = 0.325 in (a), TE = 0.37 in (b), TE = 0.38 in
(c) and TE = 0.4 in (d). The other parameters are ®xed as in (24).
Thus, over the period-2 cycle, which involves a switch between a high and a low number of ®rms within the
Union, R and R always trade with each other; they export to R only in every other period, i.e. in the period
in which the number of ®rms is low in R. However, the pattern of exports from R to the Unions regions
changes markedly. Initially, R always exports to the Unions regions; then, only in every other period, i.e. in
periods in which the number of ®rms in the Unions regions is low (and in R is high); and ®nally, they never
export.
When further increasing TE , the 4-period cycle is born with now two points in area NS8 and two in NS3.
So the trade pattern continues: R and R trade with each other; and they export to R only in two of the
four periods. As the amplitude of the 4-period cycle increases, the fourth point enters in region NS7: Over the
cycle, the Unions regions always trade with each other; export to R in two periods, import from R in one
period and do not trade with R in the last period
Finally, turn to the chaotic attractor (composed ®rst of four pieces, then of two pieces and ®nally of only
one piece). Note that for most of the TE values it lies in the areas NS3 and NS8, thus continuing the trade
pattern found for lower TE values.
When the amplitude of the chaotic cycle is suYciently large (TE is around 0.4), some of the points enter
in area NS4 (above line A), which involves no (bilateral) trade between the Unions regions R and R and
unilateral exports from the Unions regions to R. Thus, that cycle involves NS3, NS4 and NS8, implying
that not only the export links between the Unions regions and R are turned on and o, but also the bilateral
trade links within the Union.
  

    
We now consider the hypothesis that after Brexit the EU integrates even more and R and R become closer.
This corresponds to a reduction in TU for a given TE , therefore we assume TE > TU. As before, we study the
dynamic properties of equilibria of dierent periodicity; then we discuss the economic meaning of the results.
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Figure 7: 1D bifurcation diagram l versus TE for l = l (i.e., for a 1D map which is a restriction of map Z
to the diagonal), L = 30, TU = 0.325 and TU < TE < 0.4. All the other parameters are ®xed as in (24).
In Fig.8 we present bifurcation structure of the (TE , TU )-parameter plane for L = 20. In this ®gure the regions
associated with various coexisting attractors of map Z are indicated as well as some boundaries con®ning these
regions. In particular, the boundaries BCBBA and BC
C
BA are related to BCBs of the ®xed points BA and
BA colliding with the borders B and C (see, for example, the ®rst 1D bifurcation diagram in the right panel
of Fig.8, related to the cross-section marked by the arrow I); the boundary FBA corresponds to a ¯ip (sub-
or supercritical) bifurcation of BA and BA (this bifurcation is illustrated in Fig.10); the boundary FBA is
related to a fold bifurcation leading to two couples of asymmetric ®xed points belonging to the border Ib (the
attracting ®xed points in these couples are denoted BA and BA

 : see the second 1D bifurcation diagram in
the right panel of Fig.8, related to the cross-section marked by the arrow II); FIA denotes the fold bifurcation
curve crossing which two couples of interior ®xed points are born (the attracting ®xed points in these couples
are denoted IA and IA

 : see the third 1D diagram in the right panel of Fig.8, related to the cross-section
marked by the arrow III); the BCB boundaries are denoted by BC with lower index indicating the colliding
point and the upper index indicating the border line involved in the collision. For example, the curve BCBIA is
associated with the BCB of the ®xed point IA Î D colliding with the border B = B ÇB. Below we comment
a bifurcation sequence observed for ®xed TE = 0.45 and decreasing TU , noting that the bifurcation scenario
commented in the previous section and illustrated in Fig.4 is related to the ®xed value TU = 0.325 and the
value TE increasing along the dashed line. We leave an exhaustive analysis of the bifurcation structure of the
(TE , TU )-parameter plane for future study. Indeed, in our interpretation, we focussed on two scenarios: a soft
Brexit (TE = 0.35) and a hard Brexit (TE = 0.45). The former did not destroy agglomeration patters and
looking at Fig. 8 con®rms that a deeper integration within the Union may not bring major qualitative eects.
Instead, a hard Brexit led to dispersion of industrial activity. Further integration with the Union will transform
signi®cantly this pattern and we analyse this case in more detail.
If we begin from the case shown in Fig.4d (where L = 20, TE = 0.45, TU = 0.325) and will decrease TU , the
observed sequence of bifurcations is the following (see the blue circles indicated in Fig.8). At ®rst a fold BCB
gives rise to two couples of interior ®xed points (see the label BCAIA in the diagram III of Fig.8) leading to
two new interior attracting ®xed points, IA and IA

 , and two saddles; these saddles quite soon merge with
the ®xed point IA and this ®xed point loses stability, i.e., a reverse pitchfork bifurcation occurs, after which
map Z has four attractors: the border ®xed points BA and BA as well as interior ®xed points IA and IA


(see Fig.9a where TU = 0.32). Then attracting and saddle interior ®xed points merge in pairs and disappear
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Figure 8: Bifurcation structure of the (TE , TU )-parameter plane for L = 20 and other parameters ®xed as in
(24). The attractors and their basins associated with parameter points marked by blue circles are shown in
Fig.9. The right pannel shows 1D bifurcation diagrams associated with the crossections marked by the arrows
I (TE = 0.36, 0.1 < TU < 0.17), II (TE = 0.39, 0.25 < TU < 0.3) and III (TE = 0.45, 0.316 < TU < 0.315). In
particular, in I and II the diagrams l versus TU are shown, related to 1D restrictions of map Z to the borders
Ib (Ib) and Ib, respectively; In III: 1D diagram l versus TU of map Z.
via a reverse fold bifurcation (when the curve FIA is crossed, see also the label FIA in the diagram III of
Fig.8), leaving only two attractors, BA and BA (see Fig.9b where TU = 0.25). For further increasing TU the
®xed points BA and BA undergo a ¯ip bifurcation, so that attractors of Z are two 2-cycles on the borders
Ib and Ib (see Fig.9c where TU = 0.186). Then these 2-cycles collide with the border C, and this BCB leads
directly to chaos, namely, to the 2-cyclic chaotic attractors on the borders BA and BA. In the mean time
the ®xed points CP and CP become M-attracting because the ¯at branches of the functions de®ning map Z
enter the triangle S (see Fig.9d where TU = 0.05; here the basins of CP and CP are shown in green and
dark blue, respectively). Evolution of the attractors on the borders Ib and Ib can be clari®ed by means of the
1D bifurcation diagram l versus TU shown in Fig.10 (recall that due to the symmetry of the map the same
dynamics is observed on the border Ib). On this diagram one can see that a contact of the 2-cycle with the
border C indeed leads to the 2-cyclic chaotic attractor.
Recall (going back to Fig. 4d) that a hard Brexit may lead to two dierent outcomes. The ®rst possibility
is the equilibrium IA, industry is located in all regions and trade network structure is of the NS3 type, i.e.
bilateral between the Unions regions, while R is autarkic. Alternatively, a hard Brexit may lead to BA or
BA, in which industry is located in R and in only one of the Unions regions (while the other is left peripheral
and without industry) and trade involves only exports from the two industrialised regions towards the peripheral
region within the Union (NS4).
All panels in Fig. 9 start from a hard Brexit scenario (i.e. TE = 0.45); the panels depict an increasing
internal integration (TU reduces from 0.32 to 0.05).
Notice that in all panels IA has lost stability; thus, EUs deeper integration after a hard Brexit destabilises
a symmetric location of industry. Looking at Fig.9a, two additional results emerge. First, two new interior ®xed
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Figure 9: Coexisting attractors of map Z and their basins for TE = 0.45, L = 20 and TU = 0.32 in (a), TU = 0.25
in (b), TU = 0.186 in (c) and TU = 0.05 in (d) (see blue circles in Fig.8). The other parameters are ®xed as in
(24).
points o the diagonal appear that introduce an asymmetry between the Unions regions. They are located in
area NS2, where only one way trade occurs within the Union, from the more to the less industrialised region;
R remains autarkic (as in IA). Second, the basins of attraction of these two equilibria show an intermingled
structure, implying that it is diYcult to predict in which of the two equilibria the dynamic process will settle
(this holds in particular for initial conditions close to BS, in which the Unions regions are almost symmetric).
These additional new ®xed points (that involve asymmetry between the Unions regions) disappear for a deeper
integration within the Union (i.e. for lower TU values, see Fig. 9b-d).
The two other possible equilibria, BA and BA, persist  ®rst as ®xed points coexisting with the new
interior ®xed points (Fig. 9a); then as the only ®xed points (Fig. 9b); then as period-2 cycles (Fig. 9c) and
®nally as two-piece chaotic attractors that coexist with stable CP and CP. Fig. 10 allows to analyse these
equilibria in more detail (note that for the hard Brexit scenario depicted in Fig. 4d TE = 0.45 was assumed).
Fig.10 focusses on BA (BA is symmetric).
First, note that deeper integration within the Union will attract ®rms from the leaving region R to the
industrialised region within the Union, its share in industry increases.
Second, and most interestingly, the trade pattern changes as well, as can easily be seen from Fig. 10 (note
that the A line is not relevant, since the equilibrium BA does not involve industry in R):
Initially, for TU = 0.325 (Fig. 4d) and 0.32 (Fig 9a) l was above the B line and below the B line,
corresponding to NS4 (involving one-way trade from the two industrialised regions to the peripheral region
within the Union). Reducing TU , the trade pattern changes once l has crossed the B line and enters the
area NS2 (TU = 0.25, Fig. 9b): still one-way trade within the Union, from the industrialised to the peripheral
region, but R is autarkic and does not export anymore to the peripheral region.
BA and BA lose stability and cyclical behavior takes place along the sides Ib and Ib. In Fig. 9c, the
2-cycles do not collide yet with the border C and the trade pattern does not change: These cycles still involve
only trade from R to R (in BA) or from R to R (in BA).
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Figure 10: 1D bifurcation diagram l versus TU for l = 0 (i.e., for a 1D map which is the restriction of map
Z to the border Ib), L = 20, TE = 0.45 and 0 < TU < TE . Due to Property 2, the same dynamics is observed
for l versus TU for l = 0. All the other parameters are ®xed as in (24).
As TU is further reduced, the period-2 cycles hit the border C. Some of the points of the ensuing 2-piece
chaotic attractor lie above the C border, thus in area NS8. In these points, the share of ®rms located in R is
suYciently small that ®rms located in R ®nd pro®table to export towards R as well.
Thus, if one of the Unions regions is peripheral without industry, it will always import from the other region
in the Union. R does not export to the industrialised region in the Union. With deeper integration within the
Union, R will stop exporting to the Unions peripheral region; it is autarkic for some values of TU , before it
starts importing from the Unions industrialised region. As shown in Fig. 9d, other possible outcomes are CP
and CP, whose basins of attraction are intermingled, making it diYcult to predict the long-run outcome the
closer the initial condition is to CP. In CP and CP the core, which is in the Union, exports to the other two
regions.
In summary, deeper integration of the Union after a hard Brexit involves a loss of stability for the interior
equilibrium IA. One interesting result is that the reduction in TU may destroy reciprocal trade within the
Union. It also reduces the likelihood of R exporting towards the Union and increases that of non-trading or
importing. Other interesting phenomena can emerge like cyclical or even chaotic behaviour, intermingled basins
of attraction and unpredictability of long-run outcomes concerning the location of industry and the patterns of
trade.
 
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As many empirical studies suggest, Brexit will deeply aect Europes economic landscape, in particular ®rm
location and trade patterns will change substantially with marked dierences between the regions. Empirical
studies treat these two dimensions as rather unrelated, whereas a NEG perspective suggests that they are
intimately related. In this paper, we therefore developed a 3-region footloose entrepreneur (FE) model with
linear demand functions that allows an explicit analysis of changes in trade patterns. Given the notorious
analytic complexity of multiregional NEG models, we primarily present simulation results.
In order to structure our analysis, we dierentiated the two ante-Brexit situations that are quintessential
from a NEG perspective.
The relation between market size and trade costs was initially such that the Union was a well-integrated
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economic area. In that case, NEG models predict (partial or full) agglomeration of economic activity; indeed,
we found four agglomeration patterns that are dierent from an economic point of view. We introduced Brexit
as an increase in trade cost towards the exiting region (whereas the trade costs remain ®xed within the Union);
and we dierentiated between a soft and a hard Brexit, the latter involving a more pronounced increase in
trade cots. Our analysis suggests that this will lead to a reduction of trade between the Union and the UK,
and an intensi®cation of trade within the Union; in many cases ®rms relocate from the exiting region towards
the Union in order to gain market access  in these cases, ®rm relocation replaces an export link. Remarkably,
even a region that was peripheral before Brexit with no industry may gain industry after Brexit (being now a
region oering access to the Unions market as well as oering low local competition). In some cases, we also
found ®rm relocation from within the Union to the exiting region, seeking shelter from the intensive competition
within the Union.
Alternatively, the ante Brexit relation between market size and trade costs was initially such that the Union
has been less integrated. In that case, a NEG perspective suggest dispersion of economic activity and a full
trade network, which we represented by our second parameter set. In that case, Brexit does only gradually aect
industry location; all regions maintain industry, though asymmetries between the leaving and the remaining
regions will develop (the latter maintain their symmetry). With a soft Brexit, the leaving region actually
gains industry (®rms seeking shelter from competition), the full trade network continues to exist. A harder
Brexit involving a more pronounced increase in trade cost will destabilise the equilibrium and cyclical or chaotic
patterns of industry location emerge. Most interesting, these changes in the number of ®rms and thus in
the degree of local competition will also aect trade patterns: Bilateral trade within the Union will persist;
(unilateral) trade between the Unions regions and the exiting region will only happen with low competition in
the destination region (i.e. low number of ®rms). With very high trade costs, ®rms in the exiting region will
stop to export.
Finally, we studied the eects of a deeper integration within the Union after Brexit, starting from an ante-
Brexit well integrated economic area displaying agglomeration features. We argued that in that case a hard
Brexit may lead to a more dispersed industry location (with even peripheral regions gaining industry) and to
less trade with the exiting region. A deeper integration within the Union may actually reverse the eect on
industry location, the peripheral region may again (partly or fully) lose their industry. Trade patterns, however,
will continue to show a rather isolated position of the exiting region.
Brexit will change trade costs implying corresponding changes in trade patterns and industry location. As
a consequence, economic agents welfare will change accordingly, since the range of available commodities will
vary togheter with their price (due to transport costs and more / less intense local competition), for the mobile
factor  entrepreneurs  pro®t income changes as well. The overall eect is diYcult to ascertain and we leave
this to further research. However, in many instances we found for the leaving country a reduction in trade, in
the number of ®rms and thus in local competition. These factors  taken in isolation  reduce welfare in the
leaving region, an aspect that deserves more attention in any discussions on Brexit.
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The indirect utilities Vi(l, l) =: Vi, i = 1, 2, 3, of an entrepreneur in R, R and R, respectively, are de-
termined as follows, according to the bonduary conditions for trade ®xing the possible trade network structures:
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 l < l- l, l £ l £ 1- l- l  V = V NS	 , V = V NS	 , V = V NS	 ,
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
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
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
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where l = a-hb-bT cET , l = a-hb-bTcET and  = T-TT and where l £ l since TE ³ TU .
The expressions for the indirect utilities are given below:
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